Market-based mechanisms such as auctions are being studied as an appropriate means for re source allocation in distributed and multiagent decision problems. When agents value resources in combination rather than in isolation, they must often deliberate about appropriate bidding strate gies for a sequence of auctions offering resources of interest. We briefly describe a discrete dy namic programming model for constructing ap propriate bidding policies for resources exhibit ing both complementarities and substitutability. We then introduce a continuous approximation of this model, assuming that money (or the nu meraire good) is infinitely divisible. Though this has the potential to reduce the computational cost of computing policies, value functions in the transformed problem do not have a convenient closed form representation. We develop grid based approximations for such value functions, representing value functions using piecewise lin ear approximations. We show that these methods can offer signifi cant computational savings with relatively small cost in solution quality.
Introduction
A great deal of attention has been paid to the development of appropriate models and protocols for the interaction of agents in distributed and multiagent systems (MASs). Of ten agents need access to specific resources to pursue their objectives, but the needs of one agent may conflict with those of another. A number of market-based approaches have been proposed as a means to deal with resource alloca tion and related problems in MASs [6, 20, 22] . Of particu lar interest are auction mechanisms, where each agent bids for a resource according to some protocol, and the alloca tion and price for the resource are determined by specific rules [14] . Auctions have a number of desirable properties as a means for coordinating activities, including minimiz-
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In order to effectively make use of market mechanisms, an agent must be aware of the resources it needs, their value, and how best to obtain them. In sequential decision making under uncertainty, an agent will typically consider a number of potential courses of action and settle on one with high est expected utility. However, when different courses of ac tion require different collections of resources to be imple mented, an agent must develop rational bidding strategies in order to obtain the most desirable resource sets. In many cases, these resources will be made available by different sellers at different times and at uncertain prices. As a con sequence, optimal bidding behavior in a sequence of auc tions is of considerable interest. Of course, similar consid erations apply to other forms of market interaction as well: what resources should be purchased, at what prices, at what time, what portion of the budget should be set aside for spe cific resources, and so on.
In the setting described above, an agent often requires sev eral resources (a resource bundle) before pursuing a par ticular course of action. Obtaining one resource without another-for example, being allocated trucks without fuel or drivers, or processing time on a machine without skilled labor to operate it--makes that resource worthless. Such re sources are said to exhibit complementarities. Furthermore, resource bundles are generally substitutable: obtaining the bundle needed to pursue one course of action can lower the value of obtaining another, or render it worthless. For in stance, once trucks and drivers are obtained for transporting material in an optimal fashion, helicopters and pilots lose any value they may have had.
Complementarities and substitutability complicate the pro cess of bidding on resources. A key difficulty that arises in the sequential model is how an agent computes bids for in dividual resources. An agent has a valuation for a particular resource bundle b = { r1, · · · , rk}, but has no independent assignment of value to the individual resources. While auc tion theory can tell us how an agent should bid as a function of its valuation of resource r; for specifi c auction mecha nisms [ 14] , in our setting no such valuation exists. If b is worth v(b), how is an agent to "distribute the value" among the resources r ; in order to compute bids?1
In earlier work [3] , we described a sequential auction model and a dynamic programmin g algorithm for constructing op timal bidding policies when agents valued bundles that ex hibited the type of complementarity and substitutability that arises in sequential decision models. Specifi cally, assum ing resources are auctioned in a known order, we modeled the bidding problem as a Markov decision process (MOP), and described how an agent could construct an optimal bid ding policy for the sequence of auctions based on its val uations of different resource bundles. Agents can choose how much (and whether) to bid for a resource depending on past successes, failures, prices, and so on. Unfortunately, the number of bids available at any point in time is gener ally very large. Given any stated of the agent's endowment (say, measured in dollars), the agent can bid any amount less than d for the good in question. Since endowments can usually be divided quite finely, this induces very large state and action spaces, causing computational difficulty for dis crete dynamic programmi ng. While the complexity of the algorithm grows only linearly in the size of the endowment, large endowments, or endowments that are finely divisible, often cause greater computational difficulty than the num ber of resources under consideration, inducing MOPs with very large state and action spaces.
In this paper, we investigate continuous approximations of this model, allowing an agent's endowment and set of pos sible bids to vary continuously. While this clearly expands the state and action spaces, we do this in the hope of us ing continuous function maximization methods to choose optimal bids. Once again, difficulties arise because value functions in this model generally do not have a conve nient closed fonn representation. To deal with this, we in troduce grid-based approximation methods for computing value functions. In particular, we sample the value func tion at specifi c points in state space (at various endowment levels) and use linear interpolation to detennine the value function at other points in state space. This is similar in spirit to the use of grid-based methods for approximating value functions (w.r.t. belief space) in partially observable Markov decision processes [4, II, 13, 12] . We show that the piecewise linear (PWL) value functions constructed in this fashion approximate the true value functions for the se quential bidding problem quite closely in many instances, while requiring considerably less computational effort.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec tion 2 we describe the basic resource allocation problem un der consideration and review the MDP model of this prob lem and the DP algorithm for bidding policy construction of [3] . In Section 3 we describe a continuous approximation of the discrete MDP, where endowment is treated as a contin uous component of state space and the action space (pos-1 �ompl � menta�ties are often a�dressed l ! nder the guise of combmatonal and Simultaneous auctwns; we d1scuss these briefly in Section 6. sible bids) is similarly treated continuously. We describe a fixed-grid method for approximating the value functions in the continuous MDP that constructs piecewise linear ap proximations of the value functions, and whose error can be bounded a posteriori. In Section 4 we describe empir ical results using the fixed grid approximation. We show that computing value functions at a small number of sam ple points and interpolating can offer signifi cant computa tional savings in constructing value functions and the in duced policies, yet often provides very good approxima tions to both the optimal value function and optimal policy. We also demonstrate that, as expected, increased grid den sity offers better solution quality at higher computational cost, allowing anytime tradeoffs to be addressed within our model. In Section 5, we briefl y describe two variable grid methods for value function approximation that introduce grid points into the approximation in places estimated to provide highest reduction in approximation error. We con clude in Section 6 with a discussion of related work and sug gestions for future research.
2 The Discrete DP Model
Resource Allocation Problems
We assume we have a finite collection of agents, all of whom require resources from a pool of n resources R = {r1, · · ·, rn}. We denote by R t the subset {r1, · · ·, rt}, t :::; n, with R0 = 0 by convention. We describe the quantities relevant to a specifi c agent a, since our focus in the paper is on the computation of policies for a fixed agent. Agent a can use exactly one bundle b; = { rL · · ·, rtb'l} of resources from a set of k possible bundles: B = { b 1 , ... , bk}. We de note by U = UB the set of useful resources for our agent. Generally, a need only worry about the properties (e.g., ex pected prices and demand) of resources in this set. 2 For this reason, we take U to be identical to R (possibly by ignoring irrelevant resources in R).
Agent a bas a positive valuation vW) for each resource bundle b' E B. This may, for instance, refl ect the expected value of some course of action which requires the resource in b'. Suppose the holdings of a, h � R, are those resources it is able to obtain. The value of these holdings is given by v(h) = max{ vW) : b; � h }; that is, the agent will be able to use the resource bundle from among those it holds in entirety with maximal value, with the others going unused. This is consistent with our interpretation given in Section I where resource bundles correspond to alternative plans for achieving some objective. 3 We denote by 1i the set of pos sible holdings (i.e., 1i = 2 R ).
2 This is not true when demand for elements of U is correlated with that for other resources. We do not address this possibility in this paper (see [3] ).
The resources R of interest to a will be auctioned off se quentially in a fixed, known order: without loss of gener ality, we assume that this ordering is r1, r 2 , · · ·, rn We use A; to denote the auction for r;. Agent a is given an initial endowment e of some common numeraire good (we'll use dollars) which it can use to obtain resources. At the end of the round, a has holdings h and d dollars remaining from its endowment. 4 We assume that the utility of being in such a state at the end of the round is given by v (h) + f (d), where f is some function attaching utility to the unused portion of the endowment. Other utility functions could be consid ered, but this form is often suitable. There are a wide range of options one could consider when instantiating this framework, with regard to the type of auc tions used, the information provided to agents, and so on (see [3] for more on this). We assume that the individual auctions will be first-price, sealed-bid--each agent will pro vide a single bid and the highest bidder will be awarded the resource for the price bid. We adopt this model because of the ease with which it fi ts with our sequential model for bid computation; however, we believe our model could be adapted to other auction protocols as well as to other forms of market interaction. We also assume that bids are dis crete (integer-valued): that is, bids are not arbitrarily di visible. Additionally, we assume that agents, once obtain ing a resource, cannot resell that resource to another agent. This, of course, means that an agent may obtain one re source r ; , but later be unable to obtain a complementary resource r;+k• essentially being "stuck" with a useless re source r;. We do this primarily for simplicity, though in cer tain settings this assumption may be realistic. We are cur rently exploring more sophisticated models where agents can "put back" resources for re-auctioning, or possibly re sell resources directly to other agents. Finally, we assume that agent a believes that the highest bid that will be made for resource r;, excluding any bid a might make, is drawn from some unknown distribution Pr ; . Because bids are integer-valued, this unknown distribution is a multinomial over a non-negative, bounded range of integers. 5 We make two remarks on this model. First, if the space of possible bids is continuous, a suitable continuous PDF (e.g., Gaussian) could be used to model bid distributions (and uncertainty about the parameters of this PDF, if neces sary). Second, we make an implicit assumption that bids for different resources are uncorrelated. By having indepen dent distributions Pr; rather than a joint distribution over all bids, agent a is reasoning as if the bids for different re sources are independent. When resources exhibit comple mentarities, this is unlikely to be the case. For instance, if someone bids up the price of some resource r; (e.g., trucks), they may subsequently bid up the price of complementary resource ri (e.g., fuel or drivers). If agent a does not ad mit a model that can capture such correlations, it may make poor bids for certain resources. Once again, we make this assumption primarily for ease of exposition. Admitting cor relations does not fundamentally change the nature of the algorithms to follow, though it does raise interesting mod eling and computational issues [3] .
Computing Bids by Dynamic Programming
The difficulty in computing bids for the sequential auctions A ; lies in the fact that the agent does not have a specific val uation for any individual good; rather, it has valuations over bundles. This suggests an agent should compute a bidding policy in which bids for specifi c resources are conditioned on the outcomes of previous auctions. In [3] we model this problem as a fully observable MDP [16, 2] . The computa tion of an optimal bidding policy can be implemented using a standard stochastic dynamic programmi ng algorithm such as value iteration. We briefl y recap this model below. As we will point out later in this section, optimal policy con struction may be computationally intensive. The main goal of this paper to examine specifi c approximations to ease this burden. However, this dynamic programmi ng model deals with the complementarities and substitutability inherent in our resource model; no special devices are required. Fur thermore, it automatically deals with issues such as uncer tainty, dynamic valuation, "sunk costs," and so on. Finally, we stress that given stationary, uncorrelated bid distribu tions, the computed policy is optimal. We assume the decision problem is broken into n+ 1 stages, n stages at which bidding decisions must be made, and a terminal stage at the end of the round. We use a time index 0 � t � n to refer to stages--time t refers to the point at which auction A t + ! for r t +1 is about to begin. The state of the decision problem for agent a at time t is given by two variables: h1 C R1, the subset of resources R1 held by agent a; and d1, the dollar amount (unspent endowment) available for future bidding. We write (h, d)1 to denote the state of a's decision problem at timet. The dynamics of the decision process can be characterized by a's estimated transition distributions. Assuming that prices are drawn independently from the stationary distribu tions Pr;, agent a can predict the effect of any action (bid) z available to it. If agent a is in state (h, d)1 at stage t, it can bid for r t + l any amount 0 � z � d1• Letting w denote the highest bid offered by other agents, if a bids z at timet, it will transition to state (h U {r 1 +1},d-z) t + 1 with proba bilityPr1+ 1 (w < z) and to(h,d)1+1 withPr t +1(w � z).6 The final piece of the MDP is a reward function q. We simply associate a reward of zero with all states at stages 0 through n -1, and assign reward v(h) + f( ). An optimal bidding pol icy is any 1r that has maximal expected reward at every state.
We compute the optimal policy using value iteration [ 16] , defining the value of states at stage t using the value of states at stage t + 1. Specifically, we set
and define, for each t < n:
z�d be extended to allow for equilibrium computation. How ever, there are several reasons for using the approach de scribed above rather than a full Bayes-Nash equilibrium model [21] . First, equilibrium computation is often infea sible, especially in a nontrivial sequential, multi-resource setting like ours. Second, the information required on the part of each agent, nan1ely a distribution over the possible types of other agents, is incredibly complex--an agent type in this setting is its valuations for all resource bundles, mak ing the space of types unmanageable in general. 7 Finally, the common knowledge assumptions usually required for equilibrium analysis are unlikely to hold in this setting. Our model is thus more akin to limited rationality models (e.g., fictitious play [5, 9] ), in particular, when agents attempt to learn bid distributions over time [3] . A consequence of this approach is that, in early rounds, allocations may not be effi cient. However, learning behavior tends to lead to efficient outcomes after some number of rounds, and often leads to optimal allocations (with respect to social welfare) [3] . manage some of the complexity associated with various re source combinations by using certain pruning and general ization strategies; a number of these are described in [3] .
Reducing the impact of the number of possible bids is more difficult. We can certainly restrict the state and action space to dollar values no greater than a's initial endowment e. If the PDF is well-behaved (e.g., concave), pruning is pos sible: for instance, once the expected value of a larger bids starts to decrease, search for a maximizing bid can be halted. Another method for dealing with this is to assume that endowment and bids are continuous. We turn our at tention to this strategy in the next section.
We point out that the model described above does not al low for strategic reasoning on the part of the bidding agent. The agent takes the expected prices as given and does not attempt to compute any form of equilibrium. The motiva tion for this model is described in more detail in [3] : briefly, we assume there that the price models will be adjusted over time with the aim of converging to some form of equilib rium. We expect that the MDP model described here could
When an agent's initial endowment is large or finely divisible, value iteration can be computationally expensive. For instance, given an endowment of$! 0,000 which can be bid in $1 increments, the state space of the MDP has size 10,000 · 11il and the action space has size 10,000. An en dowment of $100 with penny increments is just as large. In order to deal with the computational complexity incurred by such endowments, we assume that endowments and bids are continuous-valued. This allows us to use continuous opti mization methods to compute optimal bids as a function of the state and represent our value functions in a continuous fashion. In Section 3.1 we describe the continuous MDP, while in Section 3.2 we present a fixed-grid, approximate representation for value functions, and show how to solve the MDP using this representation. is not problematic. Equation (2) requires that we find the bid z that maximizes Q((h, d) n -1, z) . As long as the re ward function is monotonically increasing with remaining endowment and the probability of winning a resource in creases with higher bids (and both are well-behaved), it is easy to see that the Q-function has a unique maximum. Thus the corresponding constrained maximization problem is easy to solve. The difficulty lies in the fact that we can not compute the value function at the infinitely many states (varying with possibly endowment). In general, the value function vh n-l will not have a convenient closed form, nor will vt for any t < n.
Continuous Version of the MDP
To circumvent this difficulty, we adopt a grid-based ap proach to approximating the continuous (component) value functions at each stage. This method of approxima tion is fairly common in representing value functions in continuous-state MOPs. Continuous domains are studied quite frequently in reinforcement learning (RL ), and arise in the conversion of POMOPs to belief state MOPs. In fact, the grid-based approach to computing value functions for PO MOPs is a commonly used approximation technique [4, 11, 13, 12] . Unlike belief state MOPs (which have an n -!-dimensional state space, where n is the number of system states) or many multi-dimensional control and RL problems, our domain has only one continuous dimension. As such, we are not affected by the curse of dimensional ity that often plagues grid-based approximation methods in other areas: increasing the density of our grid causes only a linear increase in required computational effort.
A Uniform Fixed Grid Approach
Let us assume that we are given some representation of the continuous value function components Vt for each h � R1• sents the true value function, the dashed line an approxima tion using a coarse grid, and the dotted line an approxima tion using a fine grid.
ing endowments d at stage t -1. These grid points are cho sen over the interval (0, m] (where m is the maximum initial endowment), and we assume that both 0 and m are among the set. Let there beg such points:
At each such point d;, we compute v;-1(d;) us ing �quation (2) : �e � ote again that this is a fairlr � outine contmuous maxuruzatwn problem, and that Q1-ts con structed using the given functions V�. If each V� is correct, then we have computed the exact value function v;-1 at these grid points. We define v;-1 over the entire endow ment range using linear interpolation. For any endowment
The interpolation process is illustrated in Figure I for two different grid granularities. Note that v;-1 (d) is an approx imation to the true value v;-1 (d) in the hybrid MOP.
Our uniform, fixed grid approach to value function compu tation assumes that a fixed grid is specified in advance, with g grid points uniformly covering the interval ( Proposition 1 Let approximate value function V1 be gen erated (for all h � R1) with a .fixed grid approach, using the exact valuefunction vt + l. Then IIV1-V1ll < o(V1).
Of course, we generally construct V1 using an approxima tion vt +l ofvt +l ' thus the errors can accumulate; but they do so in an additive fashion.
Proposition 2 If the continuous MDP for sequential auc tions (with n stages) is solved using a fixed grid approxi mation, then for all t :5 n.
We note that these bounds, while tight theoretically, are generally not reached in practice, as we shall see in the next section. Error as large as this can only be reached for value functions that behave very badly. Finally, using standard ar guments regarding how error in value functions manifests itself in behavioral error, we note that the difference in value of the (greedy) policy induced by the approximate value function and the optimal policy is bounded by twice the er ror in the value function.
Empirical Evaluation
We have implemented the dynamic programmi ng algorithm for sequential auctions in Matlab, and have experimented with the approximation of value functions using sampled, continuous functions. We performed 20 experiments each consisting of four runs. Each experiment comprises the computation of a bidding policy for an agent requiring four bundles of resources drawn from a set of ten potentially use ful resources. The number of resources per bundle was gen erated from a Gaussian distribution with mean 3 and vari ance I. The valuation for the bundles was also generated from a Gaussian with mean 15 and variance 2, while the es timated bid distributions were Gaussians with means in the range of3 to 6 for different resources and variance of 0.5.
The utility function used is v(h) + 0.7d (so remaining en dowment is valued at 70 cents to the dollar).8
The four runs in each experiment differ on the number of samples used in the approximation. One of the runs, which we identifyasDiscrete, consists of an initial endowment of $30, with bids that can be incremented discretely in $1 units. The dynamic program computing the bidding policy of the agent is based on the algorithm described in section 2.2. Since there are no approximations involved, this run is our "gold standard" against which we compare the approx imations produced by the fixed grid methods. The optimal value function at the initial state in the Discrete model (i.e., expected value obtained in the sequence of auctions) tended to lie between 25 and 33 for the 20 different trials. 9 The remaining three runs consist of the fixed grid strategy with continuous bids, using 5, 10, and 15 sample points, and are denoted as G5, GlO, and Gl5, respectively.
We use several pruning techniques to reduce the number of states (i.e., different resource combinations considered at different stages). This infl uences both the computation time and the reporting of the errors. Since in a large number of these states the best policy is to bid zero (e.g., given the current resources it will be impossible to complete a bundle with the resource being auctioned), considering all of these states in error computation conveys misleading average er ror statistics (our approximations would look too good). By eliminating these states, we report on a more meaningful measure of error between the optimal result and our approx imations. In addition, we report relative error results rather than absolute error (scaling relative to the magnitude of the true value at each point). Errors reported are squared differences using ( • � • ) 2 , where e is the estimated value using 8 Discounting endowment is simply a convenient way to raise the relative values of all bundles uniformly. 9 This is higher than the expected value of not competing fo r resources, which has a value of21 (= 0.7 · 30). •.. Table 1 provides the summ ary of the number of states ex plored by each method, the mean error in the value func tion, the mean error in the "optimal" policy induced by the corresponding value function, and the maximum error in the value function and induced policy. These are computed (av eraged or maximized) over all (unpruned) states in all stages of the dynamic program. The numbers reported are the av erages over the 20 experiments.
As can be seen, we have a reduction in error (both in the value function and the induced policy) as we increase the number of sample points in the grid. Also there is an ex pected (linear) increase in computational effort as we in crease the number of sample points. These results strongly suggest that with a fraction of the computational effort ( 5 grid points) we can obtain decent approximations to the value function and the optimal policy. Notice also that the error in induced behavior is generally smaller than the er ror in the approximate value function. This is because the incorrect value function still induces optimal bids at many states. The number of states explored by the approxima tions is a fraction of the the number required by the origi nal, accurate model, but the computation per stage is some times more. To display the average and maximum errors in the value function at different stages of the bidding process, we compute the average error over all (unpruned) states at each stage and over all 20 experiments. Figure 3 shows this stage-by-stage error (mean and maximum) in the val � e function, while Figure 4 shows the stage-by-stage error m the induced approximate policies.
Variable Grid Approaches
One difficulty with the fixed grid approach is that compu tational effort is sometimes spent computing values at grid points that do not improve the accuracy of the PWL approx imation of the value function, while candidate grid points that could reduce the error substantially are ignored. In the experiments described above, this was sometimes ob served to be the case. For this reason we consider several variable grid strategies which introduce grid points dynam ically based on some measure of the likely improvement they will make in the value function estimate.
Method VG 1: Based on the error analysis above, one way to ensure that the maximum error is reduced as much as pos sible with as few grid points as possible is to introduce grid points in those intervals that have the largest maximum er ror. point is introduced at the midpoint between that pair of grid points whose value difference is the largest. This contin ues until some maximum number of grid points has been introduced or the maximum value difference between any pair of adjacent grid points falls below some threshold. We know that the error in our approximation v� is bounded by
... Here the grid point d5 is introduced rather than d4 smce Vi(da)-Vi(d2) is larger than Vi(d2)-Vi(dl). Choos ing the maximum value difference can be implemented very quickly using a priority queue: the pair of adjacent grid points with the maximum value difference is popped off the queue, and the two new intervals created by the insertion of a new grid point are added to the queue using the value dif ference as a key.
Method VG2: One difficulty with method VGI is that a lot of effort can be expended introducing grid points that have no real effect on the value function estimate. Specifically, if there is a segment of the value function that is actually lin ear, the introduction of a grid point in that region does not improve our estimate. the value function estimate at all. Introducing a point else where (e.g., at d4, or between d2 and ds) would be a more effective use of computational resources.
To capture this intuition, we say that the error reduction of fered by the introduction of grid point ds is the absolute difference between Vi ( ds) (which we computed when that grid point was introduced) and the previous predicted value for d5 before the introduction of the point (that is, it's pre dicted value using the linear segment from d2 to da). This second method works extremely well when value functions have large linear segments. In Figure 6 , we see that after the introduction of d4 and ds surrounding da, the error reduction factor of d4 is close to zero, since it lies on a linear segment between d3 and dz. The ERF fords is shown by the arrows, and is greater; so we introduce points d6 and d7 surrounding d5, ignoring further splitting of the interv � ls around d4. Notice that we can "fool" this method. If we m- One could introduce a number of other variable grid gener ation techniques. While the two methods described above are intuitively appealing and easy to implement (and have low computational cost), others may be well-suited to dif ferent types of problems or different utility functions. We have not yet experimented with these techniques in depth. We note that the error bounds derived for the fixed grid method above apply directly to variable grid methods as well. Given a set of variable grid points, the error in the value function approximation can be bounded by the cS; fac tors (the maximum differences in values at consecutive grid points).
Concluding Remarks
Related Work
Auctions involving complementary goods have been stud ied widely, though it is unknown whether simple selling mechanisms can lead to efficient outcomes [1, 22] . Two methods for dealing with complementarities have been studied in some depth in the literature: simultaneous auc tions for multiple goods [1, 18); and combinatorial auc tions in which agents submit bids for resource bundles [ 17, 19, 22] . .
Neither of these models is suitable in the setting we constder, when resources are made available at different points in time or are offered by different sellers.
Even in settings where the requirements of combinatorial or simultaneous auctions are met---<>r could be enforced--a sequential model has some attractive features. Unlike com binatorial models, it relieves the (computational) burden of d � te�n . ing a fi nal a . llocation from the seller, effectively dtstnbutmg computatiOn among the buyers (as in the simul t � eous case). This can be important, as determining an op timal allocation (maximizing the seller's revenue) is NP hard [ 19] . Our sequential model also has the advantage that [8, 10) ) tends to focus the seller's point of view-for example, will simultaneous or sequential sales maximize revenue--an d does not address the types of com plementarities and substitutability we consider here.
Summary and Future Directions
In this paper we reviewed a model for computing optimal sequential bidding policies for resources that exhibit com plementarities and substitutability, and described a contin uous approximation of the model. We presented several grid-based approximate representations for value functions, and described a dynamic programmi ng algorithm that uses these PWL representations. While the resulting policies may not be optimal, we provided error bounds on the value functions and policies produced, and showed empirically that the fixed-grid method works quite well: it produces high quality value functions and policies with a small por tion of the computational effort required by an exact algo rithm. We also illustrated the "contract anytime" flavor of these algorithms: with denser grids (thus, more computa tional effort) one can produce higher quality policies.
We have not yet experimented with the variable grid ap proaches in detail. We expect these algorithms to outper form the fixed grid algorithm, especially in domains where linear utility for remaining endowment is adopted--t his is due to the frequent linear segments exhibited by certain parts of the value function. It is also the case the general strategy of adopting PWL approximations is especially ap propriate when these linear utility fragments abound. We hope to explore other approximate representations that are suitable for other "typical" utility functions.
There are a number of other issues we hope to explore in the near future. One is the appropriate modeling of correlations in prices. As mentioned above, when goods exhibit comple mentarities, it is highly unlikely that prices will be uncorre lated. Modeling this simply requires that the agent maintain a joint distribution reflecting price expectations.11 The dif ficulty lies in strategy computation-when one price is ob se � ed, expected prices for future resources may change, re qumng a change in "planned" behavior. In other words, the decision problem is truly partially observable and requires some form of history-dependent policy [3] .
Another avenue we hope to explore is the integration of the adaptive model explored in [3}--where prices are learned during multiple rounds of auctions-with the continuous approximation strategy used here. Note that to include adaptivity in the continuous model described in Section 3 requires only the update of the bid distributions, which for simple parametric forms and mixture models (e.g., Gaus sians) is a well-known process [7] .
Finally, we want to explore the deeper issues involved with integrating an agent's "object-level" sequential reasoning (i.e., the decision making in which the courses of action that consume resources are developed) with the type of mar ket reasoning described here. Specifi cally, we envision the emergence of very interesting policy patterns; for example, an agent might decide not to bid for resources until it exe cutes part of its plan because the uncertainty associated with that plan's outcome may make obtaining the resource too risky until it is more certain of the plan's outcome. A "com pound MOP" modeling all levels of reasoning seems to be an appropriate framework for thinking about such prob lems.
